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of the 1990s led to unprecedented change in the Latin American media landscape (Waisbord 2000 , Hughes 2006 , Lugo Ocando 2008 . Expansion, concentration, and commercialization gave media institutions a new relevance in social and political life. With the backlash against neoliberalism, these institutions' association with social and economic elites and their lack of discursive autonomy and distance in relation to the latter exposed the media as instruments of the powerful, thereby revitalizing media-critical discourses and dormant reformist traditions in the region. In those countries where governments claiming leftist identities or agendas emerged, these latter views penetrated government strategies, practices, and policy agendas.
Section 2 of this paper assesses the empirical phenomenon for three interrelated dimensions of this media activism: (1) government discourse on and understanding of the media, (2) direct-communication devices and attitudes regarding journalism, and (3) media regulation policies. This condensed description and a brief outline of the variation among the cases allows for the evaluation of contending explanations of leftist Latin American governments' media activism. It is argued that the current dyadic distinctions between the populist and nonpopulist left obscure important commonalities, while the nuances and contrasts in the media politics of the various governments can be better viewed when placed on a continuum according to the historical, structural, and institutional constraints these governments have faced.
Section 3 provides more detailed narrative descriptions, in accordance with the three dimensions, of the experiences of the Kirchners in Argentina, Lagos and Bachelet in Chile, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Lula in Brazil, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The final and concluding section considers the phenomena assessed in the paper from the perspective of broader global and regional trends and advances some further observations on the diffusion of leftist views in governmental media activism.
Assessing and Explaining Media Activism on the Part of Leftist Latin American Governments

Governments' Public Media Discourse
The first dimension that characterizes leftist governments is their discourse about press and media. The former share a critical vision of the latter institutions' role in society and politics.
However, what makes them stand out from other governments is that most of them have gone public with these critiques, although with varying intensity and political success. 3 This strategy, aimed at unveiling the media institutions' true nature and providing evidence of the bias and partisanship behind their self-presentation as impartial bodies, seeks to undermine their credibility and public legitimacy. It has been argued that publicly criticizing the media for "bad news" biases or "stigmatizing" them as "oppositional weapons" in order to undermine their influence has been common to most Latin American executives (Ruiz 2010) . What distinguishes the leftist governments as a subgroup in this regard is that most of their public allusions are framed by some common ideological assumptions. Although all political and social actors in the region have come to perceive the media as increasingly influential and have developed some practical responses, this response on the part of the left has taken a particular form. A common nucleus can be observed beyond particular contexts and inflections. The core assumption is that media and journalistic institutions are, despite their claims of neutrality, powerful social actors linked to the upper classes, social elites, or powerful corporations. Be they instrumentalist perspectives that view the press as the mouthpiece of the establishment or structural perspectives that view the media as constructors of neoliberal common sense through anonymous logics, these visions share the idea that within the media sphere power is not distributed democratically but according to social power. In fact, media power is viewed as essential to the maintenance of the status quo. Hostility on the part of the media is therefore interpreted as part of the resistance by the upper classes and established powerful interests to the reformist and democratizing agendas of progressive governments.
Consequently, these characterizations alternatively call for the democratization of access and voice in the media sphere, for reforms to media structures, or even for Gramscian counterhegemonic strategies. In some cases these claims are framed in terms of radical participatory views of democracy, while in others they are referenced in terms of representative democracy.
However, they all share the idea that voice equalization is essential to democracy. This democratic imperative, as will be seen further on, underlies public-and alternative-media policies.
Public confrontation between presidents and the media has been a salient feature of politics in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina. In one in two public appearances, Chávez makes negative references to the media. Correa, Morales and the Kirchners probably follow close behind him. 4 Though existent, this type of public confrontation has been more sporadic in Brazil and Uruguay; in Chile it is nonexistent. In the most radicalized cases, it is the presidents themselves who seem to go public with confrontational appeals. Nevertheless, as discussed further on, governments' public questioning of the media does not necessarily take place only through presidential discourse. It can also occur at lower levels of government; in aligned media; and through allied parties, unions, web communities, or other grassroots organizations. In brief, governmental practices of contesting big media can be performed either in a vertical and centralized manner, or, simultaneously or alternatively, in a more decentralized and capillary fashion. The discussion of the second analytical dimension takes up both types of practices.
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Kitzberger: The Media Activism of Latin America's Leftist Governments All of the above contentions hold some truth. Nevertheless, closer observation shows that ideology does matter. First, the meaning attributed by government agents to their own actions and the framework within which such action is publicly explained rest upon ideological understandings of the media's role. Second, populism-rather than a commitment to a particular cause-may be the form of politics (and political communication) acquired by governments born in the wake of a crisis in representative institutions (party system, legislatures, and also media). Third, ideological views make governmental courses of action intelligible, they are not a posteriori instrumental rationalizations of essentially authoritarian impulses against press freedom. Beyond discourse, ideology impacts the aggregate repertoire of government practices, defining government in a more inclusive way so that it comprises various formal and informal allied or co-opted groups. Focusing on government practices at a more decentralized level then highlights those features that nonleftist governments (populist or not) do not possess. The decentralized or capillary levels are not separate from government; rather, they constitute an integral part of a distinctive media activism carried out by leftist governments which is intended to denaturalize and criticize the dominant media discourse.
One example of these decentralized practices is the state media's politically aligned airtime. Pro-government use of state media is a common practice. What is innovative is the existence of certain broadcasts specifically intended to unveil and contest the political and ideological biases of private media. Despite some differences between them, Argentina and Venezuela provide examples that have achieved public resonance and have significantly contributed to government's questioning of private media.
At the grassroots level and on the Internet a myriad of discussion forums, blogs, websites, community media, and publishing enterprises, all carrying discourses critical of mainstream media, emerged establishing a sort of counter-information trench war. These baselevel initiatives aimed at questioning media credibility are linked to governments in different ways. In some cases, the link is limited to informal alliances with preexisting autonomous groups. Where governments are based on strong party organizations, as in Brazil and Uruguay, the grassroots activities tend to be embedded in the latter. In other cases, most notably Venezuela, the state plays a major role in shaping such decentralized initiatives.
In sum, if we focus solely on presidential activity, Uribe and Chávez may share the key goal of centralizing their personal authority through their direct-communication strategies, as explanations based on populism stress. But the Bolivarian leader's communications aims do not stop there. He is also building a revolutionary counterhegemony. 5 What further differentiates Venezuela's experiences from those of Colombia is not only the ideological orientation of its discourse, but also its consequent fostering of market-alternative communications networks as part of governmental media policy. Except Chile, which displays none of the features discussed in this section, all the cases considered share-with varying inten-sity-a politics of circumventing and/or subverting the dominant media/journalistic discourse. This politics is informed by critical leftist ideas such as hegemony, voice inequality, class or race biases in the media, popular empowerment, and democratization.
Media Policy and Regulation
The third dimension that characterizes leftist governments concerns media regulation. In contrast to the deregulation and market-oriented policies that during the neoliberal 1990s increased the commercial media presence, leftist policies foster re-regulation in the communications domain, state protagonism, and market-alternative forms of media. These policies aim to rebalance the presence of market, state, and civil society in the media landscape.
They can be divided into the following categories: state media-creation policies, measures oriented to private media-sector regulation, and community media-fostering policies. The ultimate goal of revitalizing market-alternative media logics is to democratize the public sphere.
Most of the countries under discussion here have seen the creation of new state media or the reinforcement of existing ones. State television and radio stations have been launched in Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina, while in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela state ownership has also extended to print media. Oppositional voices have generally objected to state media expansion as outright propaganda politics. In the region, any such policy attempt is rapidly stigmatized as "Venezolanization." However, aligned programming has also been defended outside Venezuela, where it is usually justified with claims regarding the illusory neutrality of oppositional private media. Elsewhere, governments have noticed that the public perception of state media as partisan entails a political cost. Inside these institutions, media professionals often clash with political cadres who follow the government line.
With respect to the re-regulation of private commercial media, various types of restrictions have been set up (or at least announced) at the constitutional, legislative, and administrative levels. The first kind of restriction concerns media ownership and market concentration. The second type of restriction concerns media content, such as national production quotas; multicultural programming; and lastly, in some cases, content qualifications such as truthfulness of information clauses. Such content quotas are inspired by protectionism, cultural nationalism, and worries about US cultural imperialism. In this sense, Lula or Chávez can be equally heard criticizing cheap imported stuff. A third kind of regulation indirectly affects private media profits. These concern the establishment of mandatory airtime or press space for public interest or educational purposes, right-of-reply clauses, and the provision of access for market-weak voices.
Regulatory policy agendas have, nevertheless, often remained rhetorical and have not always been consistently pursued. This gap between rhetoric and policy can be explained by factors such as institutional weakness; colonized bureaucracies; or, as is more relevant to the cases under discussion here, tactical settlements with powerful media actors. The last but still significant media policy feature affects the realm of community or grassroots media. The politics of giving civil society public standing as a legitimate actor, and fostering community broadcasting beneath the level of state-and market-driven media, has been defended as access equalization, enfranchisement, voice pluralism, and the leveling of the playing field. Public recognition of community media as legitimate actors; tripartite radio electric spectrum reserves for public, private commercial and private noncommercial operators; and other measures have been included in constitutions and legislation.
In most cases, new legislation picks up on reform proposals developed by civil society groups engaged in media democratization. This has provided governments with some sectoral support. Nevertheless, these groups have not been unconditional allies. A frequent complaint on the part of community operators is that formal barriers (antenna power limits, confinement to rural areas, administrative costs) and informal thresholds (centralized administration inaccessible to remote groups) still persist, thereby favoring big interests. Official alternative media policies also awaken fears of co-optation, instrumentalization, and loss of autonomy in community broadcasters.
The three analytical dimensions discussed above generalize a sort of ideal-typical model of leftist governments' media activism, against which empirical cases can be contrasted. Table 1 summarizes the main features of leftist media activism in the cases explored. As can be seen from the table, the governments under consideration perform differently for each dimension. What factors best account for the differences? Can these differences be explained by maintaining the existence of a common leftist core? Does Chile fall within the boundaries of leftist media activism?
The current polarization in regional political debates has made the politically laden claims regarding the existence of "two lefts" dominant. 6 This understanding has widely permeated the current debate in media politics as well. Differences have been reduced to dichotomies such as "populist" versus "nonpopulist," "authoritarian" versus "democratic," and "archaic" versus "modern" lefts. According to such depictions, media confrontation and media reform policies are a function of personalistic or autocratic impulses intended to reduce freedom of expression and suppress dissent. Leftism, according to this view, is merely an instrumental facade used to gain support; at best it is an expression of political immaturity and irresponsibility. In opposition to this "immature" left is the "mature" left, which has learned the lessons of history and accepts press freedom as part of democratic politics (Petkoff 2005 , Castañeda 2006 ). I argue that these binary distinctions obscure important commonalities and continuities.
The nuanced differences summarized in the table may be more consistently explained, following Kenneth Roberts (2008 , 1995 , by looking at the variable historical, structural, and institutional constraints that have shaped and conditioned the agendas pushed forward by these various governments. 6 For an overview of these distinctions and critical discussions see Ramírez Gallegos (2006 Gómez Vela 2006) . In both these cases, big media's credibility crisis occurred prior to the left turn and, as will be seen, determined the perceptions and strategic stances of the nascent leadership. These crises not only shaped the new elites' views on the media-since they undermined the image of media institutions as a credible, representative and fair mirror of society-but also provided the new governments with political room to maneuver and encouraged them to push forward a radical media politics.
The same process occurred in Venezuela, although the episodes that brought about the media's credibility crisis occurred subsequent to governmental change. As Ellner (2008: 109) argues, the prevailing discussions, which focus on Chávez's populist style and personality, neglect the consistency and steady radicalization of his policies. Further radicalization has occurred each time the opposition has experienced a political setback. Its obsession with removing Chavez led the opposition to disdain political organization and to resort to putschist and anti-institutional strategies. These failed attempts had the consequence of further radi-calizing the government's policy agendas. The evidence of this disdain for institutional politics was manifested in the media's cartelized oppositional behavior during the 2002/03 crises and the resulting collapse in media credibility (Díaz Rangel 2002 , Botía 2007 . Instead of the authoritarian personality ascribed to Chávez, it is actually Venezuela's institutional weakness that accounts more for the radicalization of Bolivarian communication politics. Radicalism in media activism is not caused by populism. Rather, both phenomena are possible under the same structural conditions. The views and ends that inform and shape media activism in the countries under consideration can be better understood by focusing on ideology
Although Argentina suffered a partial collapse of its party system, its institutional crisis was not as extreme as those in the Andean countries. Despite their hegemony in the legislative arena, the Kirchners initially faced some constraints from civic and interest-based organizations, the media, and governors (Levitsky and Murillo 2008) . These existing political and societal constraints notwithstanding, the Kirchners radicalized their confrontation with the media.
This radicalization took place after a long agrarian strike that was backed by some of the big news media. As a result, the Kirschners' popularity levels fell spectacularly by 2008 and they lost the midterm elections. Nevertheless, the radicalized media activism they pursued after In the next section a detailed descriptive narrative account of the country cases shows how the various constraints discussed above have been reflected in the leftist governments' media activism.
The Country Experiences
Chávez's rise to power as a result of the total collapse of the former political order and the crisis of its political and media institutions explains Venezuela's position as the most radicalized in all the media activism dimensions. Through the successive phases of his government's radicalization, Chávez's antagonism in reference to the media escalated. From the outset in 1999, the president frequently criticized the media's coverage of government as distorted. He attributed this distortion to the fact that both the printed press and commercial television were controlled by an "oligarchy" used to a past of privilege, stating that this oligarchy was resisting the ending of its privilege by a newly empowered "people." After the episodes of 2002 and 2003, 7 in which the media played an eminently political role, as exhibited in their cartelized and conspiratorial behavior, Chávez began to call them-somewhat justifiably-"putschists" (golpistas). He has since regularly denounced their "terror campaigns" as intended to destabilize government.
Given the US administration's and US media organizations' overt support of the Venezuelan opposition, Chávez's revolutionary narrative increasingly played the anti-imperialist chord (Ellner 2008: 196-202) . As of 2002 no distinction was made between the behavior of na- tional private media and the international networks (especially CNN). The "imperialist,"
"hegemonic," "capitalist," and "neoliberal" character of their uniform voice is, according to this perspective, a natural product of the alliance between local oligarchs and the US government 8 (Zúquete 2008) . This conglomerate occupies the role of the "counterrevolutionary"
force. Additionally, with the rise of the idea of "twenty-first-century socialism," Chávez began to criticize the media for promoting individualistic and egoistic values, as opposed to the new revolutionary consciousness required.
In addition to anti-imperialism, there is a second way in which the Bolivarian discourse transcends national boundaries. This is through the idea that real independence from imperialism can only be achieved through joint Latin American strategies and "international solidarity" against US hegemony (Ellner 2008: 189) . This regional perspective on the part of the Bolivarian revolution has practical consequences in the media realm since it is the ideological pillar of initiatives such as Telesur and those supporting regional alternative-media policies.
All these views, embedded in a narrative of popular redemption, coexist and are intertwined with the secular topic of voice democratization. At a rally in April 2007 Chávez defended the nonrenewal of Radio Caracas Televisión's (RCTV) license as the returning to the people of something they owned-the radio electric spectrum-and that they had been stripped off 50 years previously by a family from the rich oligarchy. Back in popular hands, frequencies were to be redistributed to transmit the voices of the previously excluded.
Hugo Chávez popularized regular presidential broadcasting with his Aló Presidente. This paradigmatic example of direct communication started in 1999 as a radio broadcast; since 2000 it has also aired on television on Sundays and has an average length of five hours. In the beginning, a talk show format prevailed. The president answered calls from common people, listened to their problems, advised and provided solutions, thereby displaying a strong identification with popular sectors previously excluded from public life. The program's granting of visibility to the poor explains its immediate popularity (Cañizález 2003: 33) . Since then the broadcast has also entailed other performative functions. Touring locations around the country, the president has often required government officials to attend, questioning them about the topics of the day. He has also used the program to issue orders, threaten domestic adversaries or criticize international rivals. It has been observed that Chávez has invented a way to stage government through television (Anderson 2008) . Aló Presidente plays a central role in setting the public agenda. The president's televised deeds are usually Monday's Venezuelan news headlines. Simultaneously, the Bolivarian leader has devised his broadcast as a pedagogical vehicle for the popular indoctrination in the ideas of twenty-first-century socialism. 9
In addition to Aló Presidente, the mandatory broadcasting of presidential speeches (cadenas) has become a frequent resource for direct communication. Especially during times of political crisis, Chávez has justified the mechanism as a way to fight the "lies" and "disinforma-8
Chávez often derides media owners as pitiyanqui (Yankee-lover) bourgeoisie. Venezuela has also been a leader in the creation of state media. In addition to revamping the preexisting national television and radio stations (VTV and RNV), the administration has created two further nationwide television stations (Vive TV and TVes). 12 The state-controlled radio network has also been expanded. And, consistent with its geopolitical views, the Bolivarian government is now the main stakeholder in Telesur, the regional news network conceived of as both a vehicle for Latin American integration and a weapon against US-based information dominance (Lugo Ocando 2008) . 13 Despite a wider content diversity than presumed by their critics, 14 much of these media outlets' programming is overtly aligned with the defense of the Bolivarian revolution. This alignment is deemed legitimate due to the ongoing ideological warfare. Andrés Izarra-the ex-RCTV news producer who has held key communications roles in government since 2002-has justified this expansion of media outlets as part of a Gramscian war, not incompatible with pluralism, to win the minds and hearts of the people and against the capitalist hegemony reproduced by private media. 15 10 In the wake of the 2002 crisis, oppositional protests received privileged coverage from the private media as part of a "communications strategy" intended to demonstrate their massiveness (Cañizález 2003: 35) . On April 11 the government sought to thwart the opposition's dominance of the screens by compelling the broadcasters to transmit the presidential message with cadenas. Broadcasters evaded this measure by "splitting" the screen.
That same day, Chávez was ousted. The developments that drove Chávez back to government were in part a dispute for control over what the Venezuelan public could see, hear, and read. Online: <www.minci.gob.ve>.
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TVes operates on the band and with the equipment of the ousted RCTV.
13
The interstate station initiated broadcasts in mid-2005. The initial stakeholders were Venezuela (51 percent), Argentina (20 percent), Cuba (19 percent), and Uruguay (10 percent). Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua joined later as minor participants.
14 Vive TV, for instance, has been recognized by independent observers for its innovative participatory productions.
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The restrictions on private commercial media in Venezuela are not that explicit at the legislative and constitutional levels. Given the gaps in legislation, policy formation has instead proceeded through discretionary administrative decisions taken by regulatory authorities. To most observers, the underlying rationale of those decisions has been a response to the polari- the Ecuadorian press had historically presented itself as a "moral" and "infallible" guardian of the public interest, thus hiding its true self. The problem in his eyes was the contradiction inherent in a "private business providing a public good" to the point of endangering democracy. It was government's task, he concluded, to unmask this political player lacking democratic legitimacy. 18 In his view, the Ecuadorian press, like the press in the rest of the region, had played a political role as a defender of the status quo and had "always been against pro- At the beginning of his term, Correa instituted Diálogo con el Presidente, a public radio broadcast aired on Saturdays. Often smartly combined with "traveling cabinets," this format has successfully enhanced governmental contact with local communities while reaching nationwide audiences (Conaghan and De la Torre 2008) . Similarly to the case in Venezuela, cadenas have also played an important role as a direct-communication device. In the various electoral contests, Correa has resorted heavily to existing legal provisions that oblige private broadcasters to transmit public-interest content to gain screen presence. 20 As president, Correa has increasingly rejected direct interviews, press conferences, and other journalistic formats.
In the realm of media policies, Correa's first move was the creation of a public newspaper through the seizure of a bankrupt Guayaquil paper called El Telégrafo. In taking advantage of his initial popularity and the relative lack of credibility of private media, 22 Correa has shown a radical determination to alter ownership relations in the media sphere. Regulatory authorities have already reversed some radio licenses and seized television stations linked to fraudulently bailed-out banks. Meanwhile, provisionary clauses in the new constitution have mandated the sanctioning of a new Communications Act and the formation of a committee to audit all previous license-conferring procedures. The new act not only stipulates ownership bans for bank owners and politicians, but also foresees-due to the collusions and prevarications the committee has reported-the "redistribution of illegally obtained frequencies" in the interest of the public and community sectors. In sum, while the new constitution itself contains explicit bans on media monopolies and other restrictions, the bill currently being discussed in Ecuador seeks to severely restrict the number of licenses, cross-ownership, foreign capital participation, and audience share, and to stipulate spectrum reserves.
The 2008 constitution guarantees equal rights and access to frequencies for the public, private, and community sectors, while the new bill foresees privileging public and community sectors until equal spectrum shares are reached. The new regulatory proposals also foresee content qualifications, special "citizen tariffs" for advertising in order to guarantee media access for weak groups, stipulated airtime for referendum and educational campaigns, and the establishment of local and national production quotas in broadcasting.
In Bolivia, the biased coverage of the political mobilization process that drove Evo Morales to the presidency exposed the lack of journalistic professionalism and autonomy-the result of the media owners' own political interests. During the so-called "Guerra del Gas" episodes the credibility of the media was questioned by an important part of the public after the net- Kitzberger: The Media Activism of Latin America's Leftist Governments Thanks, I want to acknowledge some media, some professionals who always advised us so that we learned. But some journalists, men and women, permanently demonized the social struggle; they permanently condemned us by using lies. Some journalists and media subjected us to a sort of media terrorism, as if we were animals, as if we were savages. 23 As president, Morales frequently appeals to the people to judge the "disinformation" and "distortions" of the private media themselves. Similarly to his Andean counterparts, the interpretations he offers link the media's behavior to "powerful," "oligarchic," "fascist," "rightwing," or "imperialist" interests. But what stands out in Morales's discourse is the ethnic dimension he adds. The media's voice is depicted as racist and as a continuation of past domination. In his speeches he often recalls the need to "fight those media that every day fight against us, every day denigrate us, every day humiliate us, every day offend us with lies."
The construction of "us" is clearly ethnic: "I want to make a very important topic clear: some media demonize us, they penalize communitarian justice; they think the death penalty is communitarian justice. Totally false."
Although regular presidential broadcasts were considered in Bolivia, the government has privileged different formats. 24 Bolivia is an ethnolinguistically divided country. Large parts of the population, especially in the countryside, do not speak Spanish. On the other hand, despite his Aymara origin, Morales can only speak Spanish. Additionally, the low level of national media penetration in distant rural communities makes centralized messages inadequate. Given this context, the government's direct-communication policy has been implemented mainly through networks of local radio stations and complemented by other aligned media outlets and presidential tours. Simultaneously, initial government efforts to sustain press workers' sympathy have failed and some incidents between the president and reporters have damaged journalist's sympathy for government. 25 In Bolivia, state television already existed before Morales came to power. His government's efforts in public media policy thus concentrated elsewhere: a state-owned daily paper called
Cambio was created, while radio was privileged given the audience characteristics. The former public broadcaster Radio Illimani, renamed Radio Patria Nueva, became head of a "community radio" network of over 30 local stations called Red Nacional de Radios de los Pueblos Indígenas y Originarios (RNRPIO). This network was financed with Venezuelan development aid. Restrictive policies towards commercial media haven't gotten very far to date, apart from the new constitution's ban on media monopolies and oligopolies. During the constitutional debates some advances in press regulation were attempted. Nevertheless, following government negotiations with part of the opposition, the new constitution ultimately failed to regulate issues of journalistic ethics, leaving the matter to self-regulation by the press. However, the government did issue a mandate obliging newspapers to grant unionized journalists and press workers a daily space to express their opinions. Now, in the aftermath of Morales's recent landslide reelection, official voices have announced that there will be a new media law in the near future.
In Argentina, Néstor Kirchner's rise to power also followed the collapse of the old party system. But in contrast to Chávez or Correa, who came to power without the support of preexisting party organizations, the then-unknown Patagonian governor rose to the presidency thanks to the Peronist Party, whose capacity for electoral mobilization among low-income segments of the population had survived the crisis. Nevertheless, urged to broaden the party's support base, Kirchner announced a "renewal of politics" in an appeal to the nonPeronist urban middle class. The dispute over these "political orphans" (Torre 2003) lay at the heart of Kirchner's conflict with the media, given the presumed exposure of these middle-class "orphans" to the media's presentation of reality. While it remained limited during Kirchner's term, the conflict has radicalized during his wife's subsequent presidency.
The Kirchners' public statements about the media have been embedded in a wider "national and popular" understanding of recent history related to the Peronist left. According to this loosely revisionist viewpoint, the last dictatorship initiated the "neoliberal" stage, which lasted through the 1990s until the 2001 crisis. After the crisis, and with Kirchner in the presidency, a remobilization of society and a phase of recovered "autonomy of politics" began. In the Kirchners' view, the media, which they saw as organically linked to the elites in society, had played an essential ideological role through the long era of establishment dominance.
The fact that politics had been colonized by "poderes fácticos" during these years had been reflected in the public sphere through the dominance of a "technocratic discourse" that discredited every political vision that deviated from market imperatives. The Kirchners' saw journalism as having being intellectually subordinated to liberal technocratic common sense and as dependent on nonelected powers. Kirchner portrayed himself as challenging this state of affairs, frequently framing the confrontation as a dispute over representation: the media claimed to represent the public by "doing journalism," while in reality they were "doing politics" on behalf of the same old minority interests. Against the media's deceivingly neutral account (relato mediático) of reality, the executive saw itself as leading a popular majority already aware of the former's deceptions: "[…] they want to write us down through their newspaper or their media. But they have to realize that we Argentineans have already learned to distrust certain things" (Vincent 2009: 14) . This governmental perspective began to be present in 2003 and only became radicalized after the 2008 agrarian conflict, during which big media's coverage was seen to favor protesters. Again, the narrative of a powerful minority colonizing the public sphere was used to initiate a political dispute intended to recover this public sphere for a democratic majority.
The Kirchners have not experimented with regular broadcasting. Instead, they have systematically resorted to controlled events in order to have an impact in noncontrolled media.
Ceremonies, inaugurations, or official visits have developed into a routine device for delivering unmediated messages that journalists have baptized "el atril" ("the lectern"). 26 The device functions-according to a newspaper account-as follows: in the morning cabinet members indicate the government "line" on radio newsmagazines; later the president uses the lectern to reinforce the topic; and finally, once authorized, the remaining kirchnerista leadership goes public with the same line. 27 In fact, government exerts strict control over government officials acting as sources, while also denying journalistic conventions. As one veteran journalist stressed, during former governments official sources were used to fight factional disputes, "but kirchnerismo arrived and things changed; the closed, jealous, compartmentalized style Kirchner imposed modified this game's rules." 28 These tactics, together with Kirchner's ironic dismissals of reporters' questions as being mandated from the media owners above them, made for an uneasy rapport with press workers.
After the 2008 radicalization of the government-media conflict, the government's directcommunication strategy began to integrate decentralized tactics. One innovation has been a successful television show, which is aired on the public station, called "678"; it has become a forum where the deconstruction of ideological, corporate, and journalistic biases is presented daily to a mass public. Through its resonance and mobilizing capacity, this format has significantly contributed to the government's questioning of private media's credibility. The 2008 agrarian conflict was also a turning point in terms of media policies in Argentina.
Until then no significant expansion of state media had taken place and only timid administrative measures to boost alternative media had been taken. During Kirchner's term-behind the public confrontations-the prevailing attitude towards private media was that of tactical settlements. In contrast to Correa, Kirchner initially chose not to confront the big media groups.
Instead, his early rulings prevented the Clarín Group, the biggest media conglomerate, from losing control of its assets to foreign creditors after the 2001 crisis. Shortly afterwards he decreed a 10-year grace period for all television licenses that were about to expire. Later, again favoring Clarín, the government allowed a merger of cable providers that granted the con- During the heated months of parliamentary debate and after the law was passed, confrontation between the government and the media further escalated. Enforcement of the law, which has still not begun, would certainly mean that the biggest media groups would be forced to get rid of much of their assets. 30 In fact, the new law severely restricts license numbers, cross-ownership, foreign capital participation, and audience share. It also establishes national production quotas and stipulates spectrum reserves. Furthermore, its implementation would mean the significant expansion of state media and the quantitative multiplication of community and alternative media.
In contrast to all of the above cases, the following group of leftist governments' rise to power did not result from institutional collapses but rather from the game of institutional politics and, therefore, from compromises between politicians and established media players.
What distinguishes the Brazilian government's media discourse-and that of the governments in Uruguay and Chile as well-is that, despite the president's undisputed leadership, government power is shared with a strong party organization. Therefore, governmental discourse does not overlap with presidential discourse, as can be assumed with the above As part of the political moderation process that led Lula to the presidency in his fourth electoral attempt, harsh internal debates about how to cope with the media took place within the party. In opposition to party hardliners unwilling to satisfy the media's rules of the game, Lula ultimately headed the 2002 campaign with a party-autonomous pragmatic and technocratic approach towards media imperatives 31 (Porto 2003 , Miguel 2006 ). This path conditioned the party's attitude towards the media once in government. Lula and high-ranking petistas have been divided between confrontation and appeasement, especially during political crises (Kotscho 2006) . Although frequently preceded by verbal escalations, the appeasement strategy has tended to prevail. Lula has maintained his petista views about media, but prudential judgment has led him to avoid confrontational tactics in most circumstances.
Nevertheless, Lula himself is a source of inherent tension between government and the press. He has come to represent the man of the povo (common people) who has reached the top political position, a position which was previously the exclusive domain of social elites.
His arrival symbolized the democratization of politics. Despite policy moderation, Lula's emergence as a national leader reignited a strong sense of "us" and "them" in Brazilian society. His discursive relationship with the media is strongly influenced by the fact that he is highly resented and mistrusted from above and unusually connected and identified with the masses below. Since the beginning of his presidency the elite press has seen "populism" in his direct-communication style; derided his lack of education; and felt persistently irritated by his catchphrase "never before in the history of this country," with which he depicts his presidency as a historical turning point.
Yet after some explosive episodes in his first years, Lula has mostly avoided open confrontation. 32 His relatively sporadic criticism of the press's class bias nevertheless applies the logic of "them" against "us." When he publicly criticizes the media, he usually brings up cases of distorted press coverage of social policies. In one such case he pointed out that "an important Brazilian newspaper" had headlined a story covering a government program subsidizing construction materials for poorer people as follows: "Lula faveliza o Brasil." From this 31 In 2002 Lula appointed the renowned political marketing guru Duda Mendonça.
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The confrontation peaked after a New York Times correspondent wrote that Brazilians were concerned about Lula's proclivity to alcohol abuse. In addition to an impulsive deportation decision, the government reacted by announcing a bill aiming to institute a journalistic board to regulate the profession. This "declaration of war" ended in appeasement after the entire news media reacted en masse against this "attack on press freedom."
headline he inferred that it was written from the perspective of someone "who has not the slightest notion of what it means for the poorer people […] to be able to build their own houses." Another case he frequently cites concerns the elite press's references to the Bolsa Família Program as "assistentialism" or "clientelism." This example comes from a resonant and insightful 2008 magazine interview dedicated exclusively to the president's views on the media and the press. 33 In the interview, which took place at the peak of his popularity, Lula declared his indifference to this media's ideological character, which he deemed to be part of the "historical behavior" of the Brazilian press. This character, he reasoned, remained unproblematic at the time given that these biased narratives were ineffective in terms of their impact on audiences and readers, since the latter were "intelligent" and able to discern what went beyond factuality. He related this idea of a nonpassive public to present-day media differentiation, which multiplies interpretive capacities. Lula presented himself as having learned about the media's nature after long, bitter experience, seeing it as something a government had to live with. As discussed below, this pretended indifference at the top and confidence in the reception of media messages at the base level is related to active critical communication on the part of the government. traditional local political leaders as it has attempted to maintain its ability to govern.
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Not only do media industries have strong lobbies in political arenas, but politicians themselves also own approximately 25 percent of the television channels, mostly regional stations, that retransmit big-media programming.
35
New legislation stipulates national production quotas. Brazilian cultural nationalism, though, is not an exclusive feature of the left. Moreover, the Globo Group, the biggest media-content industry, has backed these initiatives.
Though Tabaré Vázquez and other members of the cabinet in Uruguay's leftist government periodically confront the media, their public criticism is generally the standard nonideological repertoire of complaints: accusations of being oppositional or overemphasizing "bad news." However, as is the case with the PT, the constitutive party organizations of the governing Frente Amplio (FA) share a set of critical ideas about media and communication; these ideas are "heir to a Latin American leftist tradition" (Moreira and Vincent 2010) . In its policy programs, the coalition stresses the excessive concentration and discourse dominance of the commercially oriented media, and the need for the democratization of voice through the fostering of public and community media.
Although practices such as regular broadcasting have not been used in Uruguay, presidential communication is usually limited to speeches and press releases. Agustín Edwards, the editor, in which he plainly accused the newspaper of having antidemocratic intentions. Significantly, it was a private letter and was not intended for publication. Nevertheless, and also significantly, it was the newspaper's editor who sought public confrontation by publishing the letter. Chile also contrasts with Brazil and Uruguay in that the media discourse at the governmental party or coalition level relies on standard liberaldemocratic conceptions of the media. To the Concertacionista elites democratization has bene-fited from the depoliticization of public opinion, which has been reinforced by the deregulated media market. 36 Chile's leftist governments have not challenged the existing public-private balance in the media landscape. The inherited neoliberal regulatory scheme, which has framed the media purely in terms of market activity, has not been challenged by the Concertación (Lugo Ocando 2008) . To critics on the left, the only politics in the media realm has been "no politics" (Herrera Campos 2007) . This inability to challenge the media landscape has also been reflected in the realm of community media. The neglect of these institutions has only recently started to be reversed with a new law that merely softens the state's formerly repressive approach to them. For broadcaster organizations, this "improvement" just puts the worst Latin American legislation on community radio (Chile) on par with the second worst (Brazil) (AMARC 2009: 161) . In sum, if Venezuela lies at one extreme of a continuum that represents the degree of institutional constraints, Chile lies at the opposite extreme. The Chilean socialists' path to government has been one of submission to post-authoritarian institutional rules and compromise with established political and social actors.
Conclusion: The Media Activism of Latin America's Leftist Governments in Context
The commercialization of media systems and the diffusion of US-inspired professional ideology in journalism have resulted in increased distance between politics and newsrooms around the world. As a consequence of this distance, media coverage of governments has become increasingly critical and hostile. Simultaneously, governments have come to feel increasingly dependent on positive media portrayals in order to mobilize public opinion, mainly due to the decline of party-political identities (Hallin and Mancini 2004, Helms 2008 ).
This new context, where media appear to affect the political process with their own logic, seems to have engendered a worldwide increase in governmental media activities. Following the American example, which has long had a public relations-centered presidency, executives make efforts to counteract contemporary news media outlets' self-portrayal as the watchdogs of state affairs on behalf of society. This counteroffensive in the public sphere can be seen, for example, in the growth of new professional roles and task forces related to public communication and media relations within governments; it can also be seen in the routinization of rationalized media-relations practices that, through expertise, anticipate journalists' institutional needs so as to mesh with media outlets' news agendas and generate news coverage (Gaber 2000 , Negrine et al. 2007 ). 36 Significantly, former left-wing intellectuals who served as media advisors to the Concertación have converted to mainstream liberalism. In their view, the modernization of the media system, triggered by Pinochet's structural reforms, was key to democratic consolidation given the prevalence of a moderating market logic over political or ideological impulses (Tironi and Sunkel 1993) .
To what extent do these trends explain the media activism of Latin America's leftist governments? Though some traditional features of politics-media relationships remain, politicians are faced with an increasingly assertive and autonomous news media (Waisbord 2000 , Hughes 2006 ). The perception of media outlets as influential and politically decisive institutions has grown dramatically among political elites in the region. According to Ruiz (2010) , this (mis-) conception of media power explains the general trend of governments developing aggressive strategies against media-colonized politics. In his view, the overstated perception of media power originates in the distinctive timing of political and media change in Latin America: democratization coincided with a dramatic media revolution. During the lost decade of the 1980s and the neoliberal 1990s, the media kept expanding their influence while political actors continually lost public favor. According to this perspective, it is the particular timing of these two contrasting changes, not ideology, that explains the exaggerated governmental responses to the media. This account may explain the intensity of governmental responses, but, while not incorrect, it misses the qualitative distinctiveness of the cases described in this paper.
Government executives oriented to Western PR practices do not-though they undoubt- Populist appeals claim to represent the people as a whole, without mediation. The populist standpoint is always dualistic. It is a narrative of the people as opposed and oppressed by an enemy: a minority of the privileged, an oligarchy. This fact leaves no room for the liberal understanding of the role of the press. A press that releases a discordant voice can't be anything but the expression of that oligarchy, or whatever rhetorical figure is used as the enemy of the people. This understanding of politics places the press in a partisan role incompatible with liberal assumptions. Moreover, when the populists question the worldview offered by the contemporary media, they deny-and thereby dispute-the latter's claim to represent society. Indeed, present-day populists clash with the media given the fact that present-day media, in their commercially oriented attempts to maximize their audience, also exert a sort of populist appeal (Waisbord 2003) .
According to this view of the relationship between populism and the media, the practice of pointing at the illusory character of media "independence" and unveiling the interests behind 32
Kitzberger: The Media Activism of Latin America's Leftist Governments the media is an attribute of populism rather than leftism. But while populism may explain the anti-political and anti-establishment features of ideologically diverse discourses, focusing solely on populism fails to illuminate some of the other traits of the country cases described above. Populism may explain presidents' centralized direct-communication strategies, but it does not account for the simultaneous capillary practice of subverting big media messages at the base level. The decentralized capillary practices depend on the existence of militants, adherents, enthusiast youngsters, or bloggers who identify with a cause driven by a leftist identity, not simply by populist appeals. Neither does populism provide a plausible explanation of market-alternative media policies. These are founded on leftist ideas about the media's role in democratic societies. These last two ideas point to a particular characteristic of the new Latin
American left: its discomfort with and its challenging of the new media landscapes dominated by big business. 37 This ideological galvanization, which has permeated government agendas where the left has come to power, may be explained by a factor already mentioned above: the media's dramatic expansion coincided with the neoliberal wave in Latin America. Consequently, it has been easy for politicians to associate big media with neoliberalism. Given the cohesive role of anti-neoliberalism and its importance in the resurgence of the left's popularity after the pro-market orthodoxy failed to meet public expectations, the antagonism between the media and leftist governments in Latin America is hardly surprising.
Anti-neoliberalism has revitalized a leftist core of critical ideas about press and media chairman of the station he was completely devoted, sometimes even against the will of the Venezuelan administration, to creating an alternative to CNN and to the media portrayals that reflected "us through the eyes of others" 39 (Kozloff 2006: 125) .
In addition to (or even reinforcing) ideological tradition, there is some evidence to suggest that the "Chavista experience" has also exerted some weight as a meaningful example of alternative media practices for the leftist governments that came to power after it. 40 The diffusion of the Venezuelan practices-which is due to new media technologies and international media coverage, both of which have made the country's experiences more visible to its neighbors-may have turned into a reciprocal feedback loop facilitating mutual learning. On the other hand, this diffusion has not functioned through imitation alone. Indeed, the Bolivarian government has had an active policy of spreading alternative media discourses and practices in Latin America, as the examples of Telesur and Venezuela's logistical and financial support for alternative media illustrate.
In sum, this paper has presented the picture of a novel governmental media activism on the part of leftist governments in Latin America-a picture emerging from a properly articulated view of both their communication practices and their media policies. This activism, as we have seen, is not independent from the revitalization of media-critical leftist perspectives in Latin American civil society. The extent to which these governments' leftist agendas are ideologically sincere or merely the opportunistic instrumentalization of such moods in society is a question that worries both the governments' foes and some of the social movements engaged in media reform. It is also a question which this article cannot answer. Yet whatever the answer, it does not affect the phenomenon of Latin American governments' leftist media activism itself.
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In an article published on the Spanish leftist website rebelión.org, Aharonian explicitly roots Telesur in the critical traditions mentioned above, online: <www.rebelion.org/noticias/2006/8/36669.pdf> (April 2010).
40
A former press advisor to the Kirchners emphasized in a 2008 interview with this paper's author that both believe that lessons have to be learned from developments in the relationship between government and media in Venezuela.
